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Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court:
Can Police Arrest Suspects for Withholding Their Names?
John Famum*
I. Introduction
Suppose that someone calls the police and alerts them to a crime that has been
committed. Using the information provided, the police stop you because you fit the description
of the person reported. If the police ask your name, must you give it? The United States
Supreme Court believes you must if the state you are in has passed a law requiring you to give
your name. In a factual situation very similar to this, the United States Supreme Court held in
Hiibel v. Sixth JudicialDistrictCourt' that the Nevada law requiring a person to provide his
name in this situation does not violate either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.
This note examines the Hiibel decision and its effect on the future. Part II reviews the
history behind the Court's current view of Fourth Amendment seizures of person and the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. Part III examines the majority
opinion and dissent of Hiibel. Finally, Part IV discusses the effect of the Hiibel decision on
Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
II. Historical Background of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Issues Raised By Hiibel
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated..., 2 However, "what the Constitution
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
3
unreasonable searches and seizures."
1. Terry v. Ohio
In Terry v. Ohio4 , the Court determined "whether it is always unreasonable for a
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is
probable cause for an arrest." 5 The Court in Terry held that a police officer may perform a brief
frisk of a suspect stopped by a police officer on less than probable cause. 6 The police officer in
* John Farnum is currently a second-year law student at the T.C. Williams School of Law at the University of
Richmond in Richmond, Virginia.
1Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004) [hereinafter Hiibel].
2 U.S.CONST. amend. IV.
3 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
4 392 U.S. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Terry].
5
Id at 15.
6 I. at 30. Specifically the Court held that:
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Terry had observed petitioner and two cohorts engage in suspicious behavior outside a store
window. 7 The officer "suspected the men of 'casing a job, a stick up"' due to his experience as
an officer 8. Based on his suspicion, the officer decided to investigate and approached the three
men and identified himself as a police officer. After his inquiries led to mumbled responses, the
officer spun Terry around and patted down the
outside of his clothing 9. During the course of the
10
revolver.
a
pat down, the officer discovered
Petitioner brought suit claiming that the admission of the revolver in evidence violated
his Fourth Amendment rights." In rejecting this claim, the Court first determined that the
actions in this case did constitute a seizure, in that "whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."' 12 Accordingly,
the frisk must be conducted within the confines of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 Therefore, the constitutionality of a frisk must be
determined by "balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails."' 4 The Court concluded that the governmental interests of crime prevention and
security of the officer outweighed the invasion of Terry's personal privacy.15
2. Delaware v. Prouse and Brown v. Texas
Eleven years after the Supreme Court handed down its holding in Terry v. Ohio, the
Court decided two cases involving investigative stops (Terry stops). The decisions of Delaware
v. Prouse16 and Brown v. Texas 17 both served as extension of the interests served by Terry.
In Delaware v. Prouse, a police officer stopped a vehicle occupied by defendant in order
to check his driver's license and registration.' 8 The officer had observed neither traffic nor

... where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.
Id.
7 Id. at 6. The officer testified that the behavior was an "elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of [a]
store
window." Id.
8

id

9 Id. at 7.
10
d.
l Id. at 7-8.
12Id. at 16.
13Id. at 16, n. 12.
14
Id.at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)) (alterations in original).
" Id. at 22-23.
16 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
17 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
18 Prouse,440 U.S. at 650.
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instrument violations prior to the stop. 19 However, upon walking up to the vehicle the officer
smelled marijuana smoke and seized marijuana that was in plain view on the car floor. 20 The
Court held that spot checks on vehicles conducted without reasonable suspicion were violative of
the Fourth Amendment. 21 The Court noted that "the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 22 However, the Court noted
that a less intrusive manner of spot checking, such as road-blocks, which do not involve the
unconstrained exercise
of discretion, would provide a proper balance of governmental and
23
interests.
individual
In Brown v. Texas, appellant was arrested and subsequently convicted for refusing to
comply with a policeman's demand that he identify himself pursuant to Texas Penal Code, which
criminalized a failure to respond to a request for identification from a police officer.24 Prior to
arrest, the appellant had been seen in an alley walking away from another man.25 The officer
testified appellant was stopped because he "looked suspicious and [my partner and I] had never
seen that subject in that area before." 26 The officers did not claim they suspected appellant of
any misconduct or being armed.27 In reversing appellant's conviction, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion that he was involved in
criminal conduct. 28 Accordingly, even though the statute aimed to prevent crime, a
governmental interest, the Fourth Amendment does29not allow it because "the risk of arbitrary and
abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits."
B. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.",30 The Fifth Amendment privilege "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could
lead to other evidence that might be so used.

31

19
Id.
20 id.

21

1d.at 663.

22Id. at 654.
23

24

Id. at 663.
Brown, 443 U.S. at 49.

25Id. at 48.

261d. at 49.
27 id.

28

1d at 51-52.

29Id at 52.
30

31

amend. V.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972) (citations omitted).
U.S.CONST.
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1. Hoffman v. United States
In Hoffmnan v. UnitedStates32, petitioner declined to answer questions as to his
occupation, as to when he had last seen another named individual, and the whereabouts of that
individual, on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him of a federal offense. 33
In a challenge to the petitioner's claim of privilege, the district court found no substantial danger
of incrimination and ordered petitioner to answer the questions. 34 Upon refusal to do so,
petitioner was adjudged in criminal contempt.35 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the decision.36 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the
petitioner, holding that, in light of the circumstances, petitioner had a reasonable concern that
answering the questions might subject him to criminal liability, thus petitioner was afforded
protection under the Fifth Amendment. 37 In support of its holding, the Court stated that "[t]he
privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction
under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would
furnish a link in the
38
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime."
2. Doe v. United States
In Doe v. UnitedStates39 petitioner was "the target of a federal grand jury investigation...
40
[regarding possible] fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income."
When the federal government questioned Doe regarding certain bank records, Doe invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 4 1 The federal government then sought a
court order compelling Doe to sign twelve consent forms for the disclosure of certain bank
records in Doe's suspected control.4 2 The motion was denied by the district court,43 but the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding "that Doe could not assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege.., because the form 'did not have testimonial significance."' 44 On
12

13

34

341 U.S. 479 (1951)
Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 481-82.

1d. at 482.

35 id.
36

37

38

Id. at 484.

Id. at 489-90.

Id. at 486 (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950)). The court went onto state that:
this protection must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend
danger from a direct answer. The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he
declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his say-so does not of itself establish the
hazard of incrimination.... [but in order] [t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from
the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result.

Id. at 486-87 (citations omitted).
39 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
40

41
42

Id. at 202.
Id. at 203.
Id.

43 id.
44

Id. at 205.
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certiorari to the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that "a compelled statement is
testimonial if the Government could use the content of the speech or writing, as opposed to its
physical characteristics, to further a criminal investigation of the witness." 45 However, the
Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the District Court order compelling
petitioner to sign the directive did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 46 In support of its holding, the Court stated that "in order to be testimonial, an
accused's communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
47
information."

III. Background of Hiibel
A. Facts
In Humbolt County, Nevada, Sheriffs Deputy Lee Dove drove to the scene of a reported
assault. 48 That afternoon a citizen had called the Humbolt County Sheriffs Department and
reported seeing a man strike a female passenger inside a red and silver GMC truck on Grass
Valley Road. 49 As Dove approached the truck, the officer noticed skid marks in the gravel
behind the vehicle, indicating that the vehicle had come to stop in a sudden manner.5 ° The
officer saw Hiibel standing outside the truck and a young woman inside.5'
Dove approached Hiibel, explained that he was investigating a fight, and then realized
that Hiibel was intoxicated.52 The officer asked Hiibel if he had "any identification on him," but
Hiibel did not comply and asked why Dove needed to see his identification. 53 The officer
45

1d. at 207.

at 219.
Id. at 210. The Court went on to clarify this requirement as follows:

461d

47

This understanding is perhaps most clearly revealed in those cases in which the Court has held that
certain acts, though incriminating, are not within the privilege. Thus, a suspect may be compelled
to furnish a blood sample, to provide a handwriting exemplar or a voice exemplar, to stand in a
lineup, and to wear particular clothing. These decisions are grounded on the proposition that "the
privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." The Court accordingly
held that the privilege was not implicated in each of those cases, because the suspect was not
required "to disclose any knowledge he might have," or "to speak his guilt." It is the "extortion of
information from the accused," the attempt to force him "to disclose the contents of his own
mind," that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause. "Unless some attempt is made to secure a
communication -- written, oral or otherwise -- upon which reliance is to be placed as involving
[the accused's] consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the
demand made upon him is not a testimonial one."
Id.
at 210-11 (citations omitted).
48
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
49
id.
50 id.
51

id

52

Id. Officer Dove based his belief that Hiibel was intoxicated on Hiibel's "eyes, mannerisms, speech, and odor."

Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002) [hereinafter Hiibel (Nev.)].
51 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
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explained that he needed the identification for his investigation. 54 However, Hiibel refused to
cooperate and "insisted he had done nothing wrong." 55 Hiibel continued to refuse the officer's
requests for identification and "began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back
and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. 56 After asking for identification eleven
times and warning the man that refusal to comply could lead to arrest, the officer arrested
Hiibel.57
B. Procedural History
Hiibel was charged for violation of Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) section 199.280
(2003) for "willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or
attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office." 58 This charge was based on Hiibel's
obstruction of Dover from carrying out his duties under section 171.123, a "stop and identify"
statute 59 which enables a police officer to temporarily detain a person suspected of criminal
behavior. 60 The Justice Court of Union Township found Hiibel guilty and fined him $250.61 The
Sixth Judicial Court of Nevada affirmed, holding it "reasonable and necessary" for the officer to
request identification.62 The decision of the Sixth Judicial Court rejected Hiibel's argument
that
63
Amendments.
Fifth
and
Fourth
the
violated
case
his
to
171.123
application of [section]
On review, the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected Hiibel's Fourth Amendment challenge,
holding that NRS section 171.123(3) was "good law written consistent with the Fourth
54 id.
55 id.
56 id.

57

Id.Officer Dove described the situation as follows:
During my conversation with Mr. Hiibel, there was a point where he became somewhat aggressive
[sic]. I felt based on me not being able to find out who he was, to identify him, I didn't know if he
was wanted or what [sic] situation was, I wasn't able to determine what was going on crimewise
in the vehicle, based on that I felt he was intoxicated, and how he was becoming aggressive and
moody, I went ahead and put him in handcuffs so I could secure him for my safety, and put him in
my patrol vehicle.

Hiibel, 59 P. 3d at 1203.
58 Hiibel 123 S. Ct. at 2455 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2003)) (alterations in original).
59
Id.at 2456.
60 NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004). The statute provides that:
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances
which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a
crime.
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identify and the
suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify
himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of the peace officer."
Id. (emphasis added).
61 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456.
62 Hiibel, 59 P. 3d at 1203.
63
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456.
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Amendment. 64 The court held that the statute properly balanced privacy concerns, in that "any
intrusion on privacy caused by NRS section 171.123(3) is outweighed by the benefits to officers
and community safety. 6 5 The court denied
Hiibel's petition for rehearing, based on a Fifth
66
opinion.
without
challenge,
Amendment
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the
Nevada Supreme Court. 6 7 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that "[t]he stop, the
request, and the State's requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment., 68 Further, the Court held that the Nevada statute did not violate the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, because "[i]n this case [Hiibel's] refusal to disclose
his name was not based
on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used
69
to incriminate him."
IV. Supreme Court Disposition
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-justice majority, focused on the precise requirements
of the Nevada Statute; specifically, the requirement "that the suspect either states his name or
communicates it to the officer by other means." 70 Once a name has been provided, there is no
violation under section 171.123(3). 71 The Hiibel Court refuted the position taken by the Justice
White concurrence in Terry v. Ohio, which stated that although a person may be briefly detained
and questioned under the proper circumstances, the person stopped is under no obligation to
answer and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for arrest.72 The Court noted that the request for
identity satisfies the reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it is
consistent with the "purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop." 73 Furthermore,
the Court stated that the conviction did not violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on
compelled self-incrimination, because, although the requirement might be arguably testimonial
and compelled,74the disclosure of petitioner's name "presented no reasonable danger of
incrimination."

64

Hiibel,59 P. 3d at 1207.

Id. at 1205.
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456.
67
1d. at 2461.
6
1Id at 2460.
69 Id at 2461.
70 Id at 2457.
65

66

71
72

73
74

1d.

Id. at 2458-59 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J. concurring)).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
Id. at 2460.
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1. The Terry Stop Permits Obtaining a Suspect's Identity under the Fourth
Amendment
The Court explained that a police officer is permitted to ask a person for identification
without implicating the Fourth Amendment in any manner. 75 Furthermore, in Terry v. Ohio, the
Court recognized the ability of a law enforcement officer, with reasonable suspicion that a
person is involved in criminal activity, to stop a person for a brief time and take steps to
investigate.76 The Court went on to stress that prior decisions "make clear that questions
concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops." 77 The
Court reasoned that, besides being routine and accepted, obtaining a suspect's identity serves
important governmental interests, such as knowledge of prior violence, warrants for the suspect's
arrest, an ability to assess a threat to the officer's own safety, and even to clear a suspect of any
suspicion.7 8 However, the Court noted that it had
been an open question whether a suspect could
79
himself.
identify
to
be prosecuted for refusing
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court rejected Hiibel's claim that prior Court opinions
favor a Fourth Amendment violation. 80 Hiibel pointed the Court's attention to Justice White's
concurring opinion in Terry, which stated a person engaged in what became known as a Terry
stop is "not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no
basis for arrest."8 1 This opinion was cited in the dicta of Berkemer v. McCarty,82 a case which
explained that a routine traffic stop is not a custodial stop and thus does not require Miranda83
protections. 84 The Court supported its argument by pointing to the "nonthreating character" of
Terry stops, which is evidenced by the option to respond to questions. 85 The Court, however, did
not find the statements controlling. 86 Instead, the Court reasoned that, although the Fourth
Amendment may not require a citizen to answer questions, because
it "provides rights against the
87
government," the legal duty in this case arises from Nevada law.
The Court also held that the principles of Terry allow a State to require a suspect to
identify himself during a Terry stop. 88 The Court based its decision on the reasonableness of
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, which requires a balancing of intruding on an individual's
Fourth Amendment guarantees and promoting legitimate governmental interests. 89 The Court
75
76

Id. at 2458; see INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).

Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458; see Delgado,466 U.S. at 216; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881

(1975).

77 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458; see United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.

811, 816 (1985); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
78 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
79 id

80

Id. at 2458-59.

81

Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 34).

82
83

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

84

Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40.

85

Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440).

86

Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.

87 id.
88

id.

89

Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
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found a proper balance in that the threat of criminal sanction helped "ensure that the request for
identity did not become a legal nullity," 90 and the fact that the Terry stop was essentially
unaltered, in that the nature, duration, and location of the stop did not change. 91 Accordingly,
requiring disclosure of a suspect's identity is not a violation
of the Fourth Amendment
92
seizures.
and
searches
prohibition against unreasonable
The Court also rejected Hiibel's argument that the Nevada statute circumvents the
probable cause requirement, in that a person may be arrested for merely being suspicious. 93 The
Court referred to the requirements that a Terry stop be justified from its inception 94and be
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified" the initial stop.
Accordingly, if an officer is to arrest a suspect for failing to identify himself, the request must be
reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the stop. 9596Applying this rationale, the
Court determined that the request was a "commonsense inquiry."
2. Application of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on self-incrimination
After rejecting Hiibel's Fourth Amendment claims, the Court went on to similarly reject
Hiibel's Fifth Amendment claim. 97 The Court observed that "[t]o qualify for the Fifth
98
Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.,
The majority disposed of Hiibel's Fifth Amendment claim on the ground that it failed to present
any reasonable danger of incrimination.99 Citing Kastigarv. United States,'l ° the Court
explained that the disclosure must be the type that the "witness reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used."'' Hiibel
failed to provide a explanation of how his name might be used against him in a criminal
prosecution. Thus, absent a real and appreciable fear that the disclosure would incriminate him,
the Fifth Amendment does not take precedence over the Nevada statute. 10 2 The majority also
stated that the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement is important, suggesting that disclosing
90 Hiibel, 124
91

S. Ct. at 2459.
Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (holding that the seizure cannot continue for an

excessive period of time); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (holding that the seizure cannot
resemble
a traditional arrest).
92
Hiibei, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
93 id.

94

Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).

95 Id see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (requiring "a reasonable basis for believing that

fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime").
96 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
97 Id. However, prior to rejecting Hiibel's arguments, the Court declined to resolve the issue on respondent's
argument. Respondent argued that the statements required under NRS § 171.123(3) are nontestimonial, thus outside
the scope of Fifth Amendment protection. The Court noted that stating one's name or producing identifying
documents may certainly be testimonial, in that they "may qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity." Id.
(citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)); see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35, 41
(2000).
98 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460; see also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34-38.
99
Id. (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896) ("noting that where 'the answer of the witness will not
directly show his infamy, but only tend to disgrace him, he is bound to answer').
100 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
101 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460 (quoting Kastigar,406 U.S. at 445).
102
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
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one's name is, generally, "insignificant in the scheme of things.' ' 3 However, the Court left
open the possibility that a case may arise in which disclosing one's identity during a Terry stop
might create a0 reasonable
danger of incrimination and thus invoke the protection of the Fifth
1 4
Amendment.
B. Stevens' Dissent
In Stevens' view, the scope of the Nevada statute does not circumscribe the Fifth
Amendment's "broad constitutional right to remain silent.' 1 5 Stevens suggested that the Fifth
Amendment guarantee extends to a criminal trial, 10 6 a grand jury investigation, 10 7 and during a
custodial interrogation in a police station, 10 8 and there is no reason why a police interrogation
based on suspicion, rather that probable cause, should receive any lesser protection.109 Further,
Justice Stevens argued that the communication of one's name is testimonial in that it is made in
response to a question posed by a police officer. 110 Justice Stevens goes on to state that the
disclosure of one's name is incriminating."' Stevens argues that to be incriminating a statement
needs to merely lead to evidence that could lead to other evidence to be used, thus if a name does
not furnish a link in the chain of evidence, Stevens asks, "why else would an officer ask for
it?,,1 12 Stevens notes that if the Court is correct in that the refusal to provide one's name will not
impede a police investigation, then requiring one to provide it is "nothing more than a useless
invasion of privacy." 113 Therefore, Stevens would read the Fifth Amendment to permit the
suspect in a Terry stop to stand mute. 114
C. Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, also filed a dissent. 115 In
Breyer's view, the Court's statement in Berkemer v. McCarty116 was controlling here, because,
although dicta, it "is the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a
statement of the law." 117 Accordingly, if the Court had followed this reasoning, Hiibel would not
103 Id; see Baltimore City Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) (noting that facts the State
may establish would render disclosing one's name insufficiently incriminating); ef California v. Byers, 402 U.S.
424, 432 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990) (opinion of
Brennan,
J.)
104
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
105 Hiibel, at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106
Id.(citing Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299-300 (1981)).
107
Id.(citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767-68 (2003)).
108 Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
109

Hibbel, 124 S. Ct. at 2462.
10Id.at 2463.
1 Id. at 2463-64.
112 Id. at 2464; see Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 37 (noting that incriminating means disclosure that could be used
in a
criminal investigation or could lead to other evidence that could be used); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486 (1951) ("furnish[ing] a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime").
113 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2464.
114
id.

(Breyer, J., dissenting).
468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (stating that the detainee in a Terry stop is not obliged to respond to an officer's

115Id.
116

questions).
117
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465.
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have had to answer, but by not following the enunciation in Berkemer, the Court is eroding a
clear rule." 8 Breyer also argues that the majority reserves judgment for cases when compulsion
might not be permissible, yet the nature of the Terry stop does not permit a police officer to
distinguish between the ordinary case, such as this case, and the special case reserved for
judgment. 119

V. Conclusion
Although the state of the law has only been changed modestly by the Hiibel decision,
Hiibel makes it clear that when a person is briefly detained and questioned under the proper
circumstances, state law may require the person stopped to state his name when questioned and
refusal to answer may furnish basis for arrest. However, the Court appears unwilling to clarify
Fourth Amendment standards, beyond those of a case-by-case basis, but did extend its rationale
in regards to the Fifth Amendment.
For example, one scholar points out that the Supreme Court has a "tendency and present
willingness to hold that a search or seizure has been constitutionally commenced, even if lacking
in any individualized suspicion, so long as it passes a flexible balancing test in which its law
enforcement benefits are deemed to outweigh its constitutional rights costs.'

120

Accordingly,

this situation begs the question as to the constitutionality of requiring a person to state his name
when asked in a otherwise constitutional search that both lacks individualized suspicion and is
more invasive then a Terry stop, such as a sobriety checkpoint. The Hiibel decision does not
make an answer clear in this case, as its Fourth Amendment rationale was based on the balancing
of the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights and the promotion of legitimate government
121
interests.

The Hiibel decision extended the Court's Fifth Amendment rationale by noting the
narrow scope of the disclosure requirement of the Nevada statute. 122 The Court points out that
the statute only requires a person state his name, nothing else. This, the Court believes, is
insignificant and only incriminating in unusual circumstances. Even witnesses 1invoking
the
23
stand.
the
take
to
called
is
name
their
when
answer
privilege
Fifth Amendment

118

Id.at 2466.

1'9
Id.at 2465-66
120

Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to MeaningfulJudicialEnforcement

of ConstitutionalRights, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 285, 348-49 (1991) (discussing the recent Supreme Court decision
upholding a sobriety checkpoint).
121 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
122Id.at 2461.
123 Id.

